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                        OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                                            
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
         Arleathea Molina-Guevara was convicted of importing, 
and conspiring to import, more than 500 grams of cocaine.  She 
was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment.  On appeal, she 
challenges her conviction and sentence on several grounds, two of 
which we find meritorious.  We agree that the district court 
abused its discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial after the 
prosecutor, in summation, (1) asserted that a government agent, 
if called to testify would have given inculpatory information 
about the defendant, and (2) improperly vouched for the 
credibility of two government witnesses.  We will reverse the 
judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial. 
 
                                I. 
         The evidence adduced at trial was almost entirely 
testimonial.  The government had two key witnesses: Erick Palma, 
an alleged co-conspirator who had pled guilty and had agreed to 
cooperate with the government, and Special Agent Miriam Lugo of 
the United States Customs Service.  Ms. Molina-Guevara ("the 
defendant") testified on her own behalf, denying any knowledge of 
or involvement in the alleged drug conspiracy, and called no 
other witnesses.  The jury's decision, accordingly, rested on its 
determination of the credibility of the defendant and the two 
government witnesses. 
         Prosecution witness Erick Palma testified that he, the 
defendant, and the defendant's husband, Franklin Guevara 
("Frank"), agreed to smuggle cocaine into the United States from 
Puerto Rico.  Palma testified that, in June 1994, he went to the 
Guevaras' apartment at the defendant's direction and that the 
three conspirators spent the afternoon and evening planning the 
details of the drug trip.  According to Palma's testimony, Frank 
gave Palma most of the instructions and had evidently 
masterminded the plot.  At some point during this meeting, 
however, the defendant told Palma that the trip would be to 
Aruba, rather than to Puerto Rico.  She gave him his ticket and 
brought him an atlas to show him Aruba's location.   
         The next day, the defendant and Frank, who ran a taxi 
company, drove Palma to the airport.  Frank repeated the 
instructions, and sent Palma on his way to Aruba.  Palma returned 
to Newark Airport three days later as planned, with seven pounds 
of cocaine in plastic bags taped to his stomach and legs.  Agents 
of the United States Customs Service randomly selected Palma for 
examination and discovered the drugs. 
         The Customs agents questioned Palma, and he confessed 
that Frank had sent him to Aruba.  He admitted that he had made 
two prior such trips to obtain drugs for Frank and the defendant.  
Palma told the agents that Frank had given him a pager number to 
call on his arrival. 
         The agents arranged, with Palma's consent, to record 
Palma's telephone conversations, and had Palma call the pager 
number.  The defendant placed the first two calls in response to 
Palma's page, and Frank placed the last three.  The conversations 
between Palma and the defendant were primarily about Palma's lack 
of money and inability to get a taxi to give him a ride.  Palma 
testified that he and the defendant made coded references to the 
drugs during their conversation.  Frank ultimately told Palma on 
the telephone that he would send a cab to pick Palma up.  It was 
the defendant who arrived at the Newark airport to retrieve 
Palma.  At that point, Customs Agent Miriam Lugo and Customs 
Investigator Peter Edge arrested the defendant, read her her 
rights and questioned her.   
         Agent Lugo, the lead Customs agent, testified that the 
defendant lied at first during the interrogation, giving a false 
name, insisting that she was a taxi driver hired by a man she 
knew only as Frank to pick up a fare, and denying any knowledge 
of Palma or the drugs.  Lugo testified that, after she had 
discovered that the defendant had no driver's license, much less 
a taxicab license, the defendant tearfully confessed that her 
husband was Frank Guevara, that Palma was smuggling drugs into 
the country for Frank, and that Frank had sent the defendant to 
get Palma because the authorities would be easier on her if she 
were arrested.   
         The defendant told Lugo where Frank would be waiting 
for them, and Lugo went to arrest Frank.  Lugo saw Frank, but he 
managed to escape, and remains a fugitive today. 
         Lugo testified that the defendant told her that there 
was a plastic bin in the Guevaras' closet where Frank kept drugs.  
A subsequent search of the apartment confirmed the presence of 
the bin, but it was empty.   
         Agent Edge did not testify at trial. 
         The defendant's case was primarily based on her own 
testimony, during which she denied having told Agent Lugo that 
she knew anything about any drugs--in the bin, on Palma, or as 
any part of her husband's affairs.  The defendant admitted that 
she initially had lied about her name during Agent Lugo's 
interrogation, but she insisted that she was no more than a 
driver, sent by Frank to pick someone up at the airport, with no 
knowledge of any drugs.   
         Defense counsel's strategy was to discredit the 
government witnesses at every turn, to suggest why Palma and Lugo 
had motivation or reason to lie or to provide inaccurate 
testimony, and to encourage the jury to believe that the 
defendant had been wrongly accused only because Frank--the true 
target of the government's efforts and the clear leader of the 
conspiracy--had escaped and remained a fugitive from justice. 
         In her initial summation, government counsel stressed 
that the existence of a conspiracy to smuggle drugs was 
acknowledged by both sides, as was the fact that the defendant 
came to the airport to pick up Palma, an act which would have had 
the effect of facilitating the conspiracy.  The sole issue, the 
government stressed, was whether the defendant knew about the 
drugs, an issue that required the jury to choose between the 
testimony of Palma and Lugo and the testimony of the defendant.  
Counsel attempted to anticipate the argument of her adversary: 
              The defense counsel would have you 
         believe that the government case is a pack of 
         lies.  That Erick Palma lied, that Agent Lugo 
         lied, but, of course, the defendant, herself, 
         is telling the truth. 
 
                              * * * 
 
         You must pick through the words, the ideas, 
         the rhetoric and decide who is telling the 
         truth and who is not. 
 
                              * * * 
 
              When you think about the testimony and 
         do your job; namely, determine the truth, 
         there is truth in Erick Palma's testimony 
         which is full of details which ring with 
         truth. 
 
              You hear the truth in Miriam Lugo's 
         testimony.  Her testimony was corroborated by 
         subsequent events and by the extent and 
         detail. 
 
                              * * * 
 
         If Mr. Palma had wanted to make up a big 
         story in order to please the government, 
         don't you think he'll make up a little better 
         story? 
 
              Think about it.  If he was lying, 
         wouldn't he have said it was this defendant 
         who masterminded the deal, that it was she 
         who bought the ticket, that it was she who 
         handed him the ticket at the airport, it was 
         she and not her husband who give him 
         directions, instructions what to do in Aruba? 
 
              He was delivering the drugs to this 
         woman and not her husband. 
 
              He didn't say those things because he 
         told you the truth.  The truth is that this 
         defendant was a participant.  Not the only 
         participant.  Maybe not the mastermind of the 
         conspiracy.  But a participant, nevertheless. 
 
              Now, Mr. Bronster [defense counsel] not 
         only attacked the credibility of Erick Palma, 
         but of Agent Lugo as well.  In fact, because 
         of the strength of Miss Lugo's testimony, he 
         really had nowhere else to go. 
 
                              * * * 
 
              Do you really think this agent made up 
         all these details?  If not, do you think she 
         would make up one tidbit or two and add it to 
         an otherwise truthful report? 
 
              Why would she do it?  She has absolutely 
         no reason to lie.  In fact, it is insulting 
         to think the United States would put on such 
         a witness.  Her memory of the events is 
         unimpeachable. 
 
App. at 24, 25, 25, 27-28, 28-29. 
         The prediction of government counsel, of course, came 
to pass.  Defense counsel, in his closing, attacked the 
credibility of both Palma and Lugo: 
         Now, yes, I am going to be arguing to you 
         that Erick Palma's testimony was a pack of 
         lies.  I don't have any great concern about 
         doing that.  It is -- a little tougher is 
         what I'm going to have to talk to you about 
         Agent Lugo.  Because some of the things I say 
         to you and are going to submit to you, yes, 
         in fact, she does have some reason in this 
         case to lie.  It is hard almost to use the 
         word. 
 
              She's an agent of the United States 
         Government.  Frankly, no matter what else I 
         have said about her or will say about her in 
         this courtroom, I have a lot of respect for 
         her and the job that she does.  She does a 
         job that, God knows, I know I wouldn't be 
         able to do. 
 
                              * * * 
 
              But the fact is, ladies and gentlemen, 
         when she comes into this courtroom, when she 
         sits on that stand, she's as human as any one 
         of us.  We'll talk more in detail later. 
 
              Maybe you'll find that she hasn't 
         intentionally lied to you about something. 
         Maybe she has erred.  Maybe she has stretched 
         or maybe you're going to decide that she has 
         lied. 
 
App. at 36, 37. 
          Defense counsel's argument with respect to Palma was 
straightforward: 
              Erick Palma was a man with a lot of 
         problems.  He gets caught with five bags of 
         cocaine strapped to his body.  Where has he 
         got to go?  He's got to give some help to 
         somebody or he's got no way to help himself. 
 
              Frank Guevara is gone.  He's gone.  
         Palma can't get on the witness stand and 
         testify against Frank Guevara because there 
         is no trial.  The only thing of value he has 
         is to come in and point a finger at her.  The 
         only bargaining chip he has. 
 
              What motive does he have to do it?  You 
         heard from his testimony that under the 
         statutes he was charged with he was facing up 
         to 40 years. 
 
App. at 41. 
         Defense counsel's attack on the credibility of Agent 
Lugo was more sophisticated: 
         Agent Lugo has a very, very difficult job 
         that she does.  She has a very frustrating 
         job.  She works and works and works, along 
         with her fellow agents, to stop this garbage 
         that comes into the country.  And for every 
         one they catch, God knows how many get away.  
         You can understand and accept the level of 
         frustration that someone in her position 
         would have. 
 
              Now, along comes this case.  A great 
         bust.  A great bust.  I mean that sincerely.  
         They get this guy coming in at the airport, 
         all the stuff strapped to his body, and they 
         nail him. 
 
              Then they go the next step.  They use 
         him to try to get to the person who's 
         masterminding the deal.  They turn it around.  
         They got the information.  They find out it 
         is Frank Guevara.  Now they've got him.  Now 
         they've got a really big bust.  They traced 
         it back to the source. 
 
                              * * * 
 
              They go to arrest him.  They go upstairs 
         and he's gone.  He slipped out again.  Twice.  
         He's never been found. 
 
              Ladies and gentlemen, I'm asking you to 
         put yourselves in Agent Lugo's position.  How 
         would you feel?  How would you feel?  You're 
         out on the street risking your life to catch 
         people like this and he slips away?  
         (Slapping jury box.) 
 
              She's got a right to be angry.  She's 
         got the right to be frustrated. 
 
              Then, to make things worse, after they 
         catch this guy with seven pounds of cocaine 
         strapped to his body, he ends up sitting on 
         the witness stand trying to get probation for 
         himself. 
 
              So the guy who is carrying the coke is 
         playing his deal.  The guy who is 
         masterminding it is gone. 
 
              What did he do?  What did he do?  Maybe 
         by now, maybe with all the frustration, maybe 
         because she wants so badly to see people 
         punished for importing this garbage, maybe by 
         now she even believes that Arleathea Molina 
         told her that she met him.  I don't know.  If 
         you find that easier to accept than to have 
         to say to yourselves she's lying, that's 
         fine.  I don't care.  As long as you realize 
         she's human, too. 
 
App. at 55-56, 57-58. 
         Government counsel, in accordance with standard 
practice, got the last word.  She knew that Agent Lugo's 
testimony was the linchpin of her case and was quick to spring to 
her defense: 
              Ladies and gentlemen, before I get into 
         the main part of my rebuttal argument here, 
         there is something I have to talk to you 
         about up front.  A statement that Mr. 
         Bronster made that I feel that I have to 
         bring to your attention right away. 
 
              He got up here during his opening and 
         then just now and said or gave reason for you 
         to believe that this agent lied.  That is 
         ridiculous.  This agent did not lie to you.  
         I don't see any evidence anywhere in this 
         case, and you shouldn't, either, that this 
         agent fabricated evidence, that she added to 
         her report. 
 
                              * * * 
 
         Did Mr. Bronster ask a single question to 
         Mrs. Lugo about fabricating her notes?  No. 
         . . . 
 
              Did Mr. Bronster call another agent who 
         was in the room at the time Miss Guevara gave 
         her statement? 
 
              Of course, Mr. Bronster has absolutely 
         no obligation to put on a case, to get up 
         here and say a word.  It is my obligation, 
         the government's obligation, to prove beyond 
         a reasonable doubt that this defendant 
         committed these crimes. 
 
              But he has the ability to call.  He may 
         call.  Did he call the agent in the room with 
         Miss Lugo and ask questions about whether 
         this defendant talked about drugs?  Asked 
         questions about whether Miss Lugo way lying 
         in her testimony? 
 
                              * * * 
 
              Ask yourself why Mr. Bronster didn't 
         call the other agent who was in the room.  If 
         he called that other agent, he'd have to 
         argue not only that Erick Palma lied and not 
         only that the United States agent lied, but 
         that another United States agent lied. 
 
App. at 67, 68, 69. 
         Defense counsel made appropriate objections to the 
government's rebuttal argument and moved for a mistrial.  His 
applications were denied. 
 
                               II. 
         The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742. 
         We review a district court's decision not to grant a 
mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor made improper remarks 
in closing argument for abuse of discretion, United States v. 
Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1365 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
956 (1991), and, if error is found, we apply harmless error 
analysis.  United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1264-65 (3d 
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995).  The 
standard that we apply in our harmless error analysis depends on 
whether the error was of constitutional proportions.  United 
States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1265.  If we find constitutional 
error, we may affirm only if the error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Chapman v. United States, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1962).  If the error does not involve a violation of a 
constitutional right, we may affirm so long as there is a "high 
probability" the error did not contribute to the conviction.  
United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 219-20 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984). 
 
                               III. 
         The government chose not to call Agent Edge as a 
witness.  Prior to the rebuttal, the issue of whether the 
defendant had admitted knowledge of the conspiracy after her 
arrest could have been resolved by the jury only by assessing the 
relative credibility of the defendant and Agent Lugo.  In her 
rebuttal, however, government counsel represented to the jury 
that Agent Edge, if called as a witness, would have corroborated 
the testimony of Agent Lugo.  Thus, as defense counsel pointed 
out in his objection, the prosecutor made a representation as "to 
what some agent who [was] never called would have said."  App. at 
69.  The defendant insists that this representation violated her 
rights under the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses 
against her.  We agree.  We also agree that this representation 
and other comments of the prosecutor improperly vouched for the 
truth of Agent Lugo's testimony.  We are unable to agree with the 
government that this prosecutorial misconduct was either harmless 
or improperly invited. 
 
                                A. 
         The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is 
violated when a prosecutor informs the jury that there is a 
witness who has not testified, but who, if he had testified, 
would have given inculpatory evidence.  Hutchins v. Wainwright, 
715 F.2d 512 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1071 
(1984).  That is precisely what occurred here.  Contrary to the 
government's suggestion, this is not a situation in which a 
prosecutor did no more than ask the jury to draw an inference 
from the failure of the defense to call a witness who could be 
expected to support the defendant's position if it were truthful.  
See, e.g., United States v. Keller, 512 F.2d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 
1975); United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1228 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).  The absent witness here was a 
government agent whose relevant knowledge would be known to the 
prosecutor, and the jury was told what the testimony would be; 
this was thus not a case in which the jury was merely asked to 
infer, based on all the circumstances, that the defense was privy 
to the same information and decided not to elicit the testimony 
because it was unfavorable. 
                                B. 
         A prosecutor may not properly vouch for the credibility 
of a government witness.  See, e.g., United States v. DiLoreto, 
888 F.2d 996, 998-99 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Beatty, 
722 F.2d 1090, 1097 (3d Cir. 1983).  As the Supreme Court noted 
in United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985): 
         The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility 
         of witnesses and expressing his personal 
         opinion concerning the guilt of the accused 
         pose two dangers:  such comments can convey 
         the impression that evidence not presented to 
         the jury, but known to the prosecutor, 
         supports the charges against the defendant 
         and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right 
         to be tried solely on the basis of the 
         evidence presented to the jury; and the 
         prosecutor's opinion carries with it the 
         imprimatur of the Government and may induce 
         the jury to trust the Government's judgment 
         rather than its own view of the evidence. 
         In United States v. DiLoreto, we held to be improper 
vouching the following statement by the prosecutor:  "We [the 
government] don't take liars.  We don't put liars on the stand.  
We don't do that."  888 F.2d at 999.  As we there explained: 
         The remarks [suggest] that the government, as 
         a matter of policy in the prosecution of its 
         cases, does not use liars as witnesses.  No 
         explanation was given, however, of how the 
         government ascertains the honesty or veracity 
         of its witnesses.  Indeed, we have found 
         nothing in the record upon which the 
         prosecutor could have grounded his statement.  
         There must then have been some other 
         evidence, unknown or unavailable to the jury, 
         which convinced the prosecutor that his 
         witnesses were not liars.  Obviously, the 
         defendants were not confronted with this 
         extraneous evidence and afforded cross- 
         examination, nor was the jury given an 
         opportunity to engage in its own evaluation.  
         What the jury was led to do instead was 
         merely to infer that other information 
         existed which the government used to verify 
         the credibility of its witnesses prior to 
         introducing their testimonies at trial. 
 
Id. 
         In this case, the prosecutor, in addition to 
representing that Edge's testimony would corroborate that of 
Lugo, told the jury that it was "insulting" and "ridiculous" to 
think that the United States would put on a witness who would lie 
and assured the jury that "[A]gent [Lugo] did not lie to you."  
App. at 29, 67, 67.  We believe the combined effect was to 
suggest that the prosecutor knew more than the jury had heard and 
that it should be willing to trust the government's judgment.  It 
follows that the prosecutor's comments violated our rule against 
vouching. 
 
                                C. 
         Because the prosecution engaged in a course of conduct 
that violated the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment, 
we cannot allow the judgment against her to stand unless we can 
say that the improper comments were harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.   
         As we have noted, the crucial issue for decision in 
this case was whether the defendant knew about the drugs.  The 
prosecution and the defense respectively tendered inculpatory and 
exculpatory interpretations of the coded language on the 
telephone surveillance tapes and reasonable minds could differ 
regarding their significance.  Since there was no other tangible 
evidence relevant to this issue, this left the jury with the task 
of deciding whether to believe Palma and Lugo or the defendant.  
With respect to the former, the defense advanced and developed 
plausible theories as to why each of these witnesses might have 
misrepresented the facts, intentionally in the case of Palma and 
intentionally or unintentionally in the case of Agent Lugo.  In 
this context, it is not possible to affirm beyond a reasonable 
doubt that there was no prejudicial effect from the prosecutor's 
invocation of the testimony of the absent and uncrossexamined 
Agent Edge or from her assurance to the jury that government 
witnesses don't lie.  Accordingly, defendant's conviction cannot 
stand. 
 
                                D. 
         The government invokes the doctrine of invited error.  
As we explained in United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 
1126 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 915 (1991): 
         The doctrine [of invited error] teaches that 
         where a prosecutorial argument has been made 
         in reasonable response to improper attacks by 
         defense counsel, the unfair prejudice flowing 
         from the two arguments may balance each other 
         out, thus obviating the need for a new trial.  
         Young, 470 U.S. at 12-13, 105 S.Ct. at 1045.  
         We have interpreted the doctrine to mean that 
         a prosecutor may neutralize improper defense 
         arguments but may not rely on them as a 
         "springboard" for the launching of 
         affirmative attacks upon the defendants. 
(citation omitted). 
         We find the doctrine of invited error inapplicable here 
because we can find no fault with defense counsel's conduct.  His 
defense, and his summation in particular, can accurately be 
described as vigorous advocacy entirely appropriate for a case 
that turned on the jury's assessment of the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
 
                               IV. 
         The defendant mounts a number of other attacks on her 
conviction.  Having decided to reverse and remand for a new trial 
for the reasons we have already given, it is appropriate for us 
to address only those issues that are likely to arise again 
during the remainder of the proceedings. 
         The defendant contends that the district court erred in 
refusing to order production by the government of Agent Lugo's 
handwritten notes of her interview with the defendant, notes from 
which the agent's final report was prepared.  As the government 
conceded before us, production of these notes was required by 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.  Whether or not this 
violation was harmless is now a moot issue.  On remand, the notes 
will be produced. 
         The defendant also insists that the district court 
erred in denying her a suppression hearing pursuant to Massiah v. 
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).  In Massiah, the Supreme 
Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
had been violated when incriminating statements were used by the 
government at trial which it had deliberately elicited after the 
defendant's indictment and in the absence of his counsel.  Id. at 
206-07.  We find Massiah inapplicable here. 
         The defendant and Palma exchanged eight letters while 
both were in prison.  As the defendant testified at trial, she 
initiated the exchange because she believed Palma would testify 
against her and she wanted to see if she could get information 
that could be used to discredit him at trial.  One of Palma's 
letters was written after he had signed his cooperation agreement 
with the government.  The defense secured the admission of these 
letters and elicited testimony regarding them during the defense.  
It argued that the letters indicated Palma was testifying against 
the defendant because she had rejected his sexual advances.  
Having thus affirmatively used the letters, we conclude that the 
defendant is not entitled to a hearing to determine whether they 
should be suppressed. 
                                V. 
         We will reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand for a new trial. 
